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THE PERILS OF CONCEPTUALISM: 
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FALLON 
Robert C. Post* 
I am grateful for Professor Fallon's constructive and lucid remarks. 
They are thoughtful and perceptive. But they also reveal the limita- 
tions of the kind of highly conceptualist focus that has unfortunately 
come to characterize so much of our modern constitutional scholar- 
ship. 
Fallon argues that what I identify as the "paradox of public dis- 
course" can be dissolved if first amendment doctrine is conceived 
within the framework of Rawlsian liberalism. He contends that from 
the perspective of that liberalism, members of a particular community 
"can believe that behavior is outrageous and therefore reprehensible 
while simultaneously believing, as members of a national community, 
. . . that their own illiberal moral norms ought not to enjoy the 
sanction of law."' "If this is so," Fallon concludes, "denying the 
sanction of law to . . . illiberal norms does not corrode the necessary 
foundation [of] liberal norms for critical public discourse to occur. 
There is, in short, no paradox."2 
Fallon is, of course, quite correct that there is no logical inconsis- 
tency between the existence of community norms and the need for 
public toleration. But the limitations of this point become obvious as 
soon as it is seen that law does not exist merely on the conceptualist 
plane of logic and theory, but serves also as a practical instrument 
for the governance of society. The "paradox of public discourse" does 
not flow from the incompatibility of abstract ideas, but rather from 
the sociological tensions inherent in the dynamic functioning of the 
law. 
On Rawls' account, the purpose of public toleration is to provide 
a foundation for "political cooperation on a basis of mutual respect."3 
This purpose, as Rawls remarks, "is practical, and not metaphysical 
or epistemological."4 It can be served only if public discussion is 
"informed and uncoerced, and reached by citizens in ways consistent 
with their being viewed as free and equal persons."5 Rawls' account, 
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1 Fallon, Post on Public Discourse Under the First Amendment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1738, 
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2 Id. 
3 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 226 
(i 985). 
4 Id. at 230. 
Id. at 229-30. 
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therefore, unlike Fallon's, directly raises the question of the practical 
relationship between toleration and the attainment of "willing political 
agreement. "6 
The argument of my Article is that the social ability to distinguish 
"coercion" from "respect" is ultimately grounded on community norms 
(of the kind that Fallon too quickly labels as "illiberal"),7 and that the 
survival of these norms is in some significant measure sustained by 
legal sanctions. If these arguments are correct, it follows that public 
toleration is in tension with itself, for it denies enforcement to the 
very legal sanctions that sustain the social norms necessary for public 
toleration to achieve its purposes. The evidence for these arguments 
is sociological in nature; the argument of the Article thus cannot be 
dismissed because of the absence of any purely conceptual inconsis- 
tency between community norms and public toleration. 
To put the matter more aggressively, it is not enough simply to 
postulate citizens who can, as Rawls puts it, have "their public iden- 
tity" as well as "their 'nonpublic identity. "'8 We need to inquire into 
how these two identities in fact relate to each other; we must inves- 
tigate the nature and potential limits of the stark role differentiation 
implicit in Rawls' theory. We must ask about the kind of "political 
cooperation" that would actually be possible among persons who 
claim, as does Fallon, that the very norms that fundamentally define 
and sustain their dignity as human beings ought not to be enforced 
by the law, because these norms might not be shared by others.9 If 
philosophers can afford to ignore these hard, practical questions, we 
as legal academics cannot. 
Rawls himself explicitly rests his work on what he calls "a nor- 
mative conception" of "the person," which is distinct "from an account 
of human nature given by natural science or social theory. "10 My 
hypothesis is that the notoriously ragged edges of first amendment 
doctrine can best be interpreted as the Court's efforts to address the 
tensions that occur when this "normative conception" of the person is 
6 Id. at 230. 
7 Note, in this context, Rawls' concession that public toleration can have meaning only if it 
"provides a reasonable way of shaping into one coherent view the deeper bases of agreement 
emnbedded in the public political culture of a constitutional regime and acceptable to its most 
firmly held considered convictions." Id. at 229. For a detailed account of how a putatively 
"illiberal" culture creates normative distinctions that make possible putatively "liberal" concepts 
like respect and individual autonomy, see Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community 
and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 968-74, 979-87 (i989). 
8 Rawls, supra note 3, at 241. 
9 Rawls himself offers the caveat that "we are forced to consider at some point the effects 
of the social conditions required by a conception of political justice on the acceptance of that 
conception itself." Id. at 250. 
10 Id. at 232 n-I.5. 
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evaluated in light of the account of human nature given by "social 
theory. " 
I should also add, however, that I see much that is attractive, on 
both theoretical and practical levels, in the Rawlsian account. In this 
respect Fallon's conceptualist and ultimately procrustean division of 
theories into "republican" and "liberal" is of little use, and of some 
detriment. Human nature is obviously capable of and predicated upon 
both the autonomy that underlies liberalism and the social embedded- 
ness that underlies what Fallon terms republicanism. The issue is 
therefore not whether one perspective or the other should be chosen 
tout court, but rather whether, in the complex of particular circum- 
stances, the law ought to be designed to support one or the other of 
these human capabilities." 
Thus, despite the internal tensions of the position, I agree whole- 
heartedly with Rawls that structuring public discourse around the 
values of toleration and respect for individual freedom offers a com- 
pelling vision of "how social unity can be . . . possible"'2 under 
conditions of cultural heterogeneity. In my Article I try to elucidate 
how this vision is in fact responsible for the manner in which modern 
first amendment jurisprudence regulates public discourse.'3 
I share this vision, however, with a chastened sense of its internal 
inconsistencies, and also with a strong belief in its inherent limitations. 
There are circumstances in which speech ought to be regulated ac- 
cording to principles quite distinct from those that underlie public 
discourse. To offer only an obvious example, speech that is appro- 
priately protected when it occurs within public discourse is also ap- 
propriately regulated as racial or sexual harassment when it occurs 
within the context of an employment relationship. This is true because 
there are good reasons for the law to regard persons as autonomous 
within the context of political deliberation, but there are equally good 
reasons for the law to regard persons as dependent within the work- 
place. 
If this confounds the ready distinction between liberalism and 
11 For a somewhat fuller account, see Post, Tradition, the Self, and Substantive Due Process: 
A Comment on Michael Sandel, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 558-59 (I989). 
12 Rawls, supra note 3, at 251. 
13 Thus I am somewhat puzzled by Fallon's claim that I attempt to ascribe "republican 
premises" to first amendment jurisprudence. It is surely not distinctively "republican" to assume 
that the purpose of public discourse is "the promotion of public deliberation," for Rawls himself 
states that the "aim" of his liberalism "is free agreement, reconciliation through public reason." 
Id. at 230. Nor is it especially "republican" to assume that public deliberation cannot be 
successful if it is experienced as coercive, for once again Rawls himself notes "that this agreement 
must be informed and uncoerced, and reached by citizens in ways consistent with their being 
viewed as free and equal persons." Id. at 229-30. 
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republicanism, so be it. We ought not let these categories harden to 
the point where they obstruct our perception of what really matters, 
which is how the legal order may practically assist the flourishing of 
the human spirit. 
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